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Abstract 
The paper analyses the main features of trade agreements 
covering services concluded between Latin American countries and 
developed country partners. The General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) is devoted a full section with a view to setting out 
key analytical parameters for the ensuing approach to individual 
agreements with the United States, the European Union and Japan. By 
means of a very detailed comparison across agreements, a typology is 
established for classifying specific elements with relation to whether 
they simply mirror GATS provisions ("GATS-neutral"), go beyond 
GATS provisions ("GATS-Plus") or fall short of GATS provisions in 
some respect ("GATS-Minus"). In doing that, it becomes apparent that 
often-made generalizations can be wrong and that any analysis focused 
on one or two elements in isolation is bound to be incomplete, 
inconclusive or simply inaccurate. A full section is also devoted to the 
question of policy space with a particular emphasis on if and when the 
agreements herein in question curtail governments’ prerogatives to 
regulate and make policy on matters relating to services. The paper 
acknowledges that there are indeed many "sore spots" in those 
agreements but demonstrates that many of the existing mechanisms 
permit in any case some level of leeway for policy-makers. The paper 
concludes with ten lessons regarding trade in services agreements 
between Latin American countries and developed trading partners. 
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Introduction 
It was not until the mid-nineties, fifty years after the end of the 
Second World War, that the international trading system saw the 
introduction of trade in services in its purview. The Uruguay Round, 
GATT’s eighth, only got off to a start once trade in services was put 
safely outside the main track of negotiations. Nine years later the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) would enter into force and with it a 
full-fledged General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
alongside the results of the first-ever round of "specific commitments" 
on all services sectors involving, from the outset, all of the "Members" 
of the newly-created organization (no longer "Contracting Parties"). 
That agreement is now eleven years old and is currently undergoing its 
second round of negotiations in the context of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA). Meanwhile, the world has changed substantially its 
trade in services physiognomy to encompass a myriad of regional, sub-
regional and bilateral agreements in an increasingly complex web of 
rules, principles and commitments.  
Latin America has been a major player in the evolving trade in 
services regime. Participation in the Uruguay Round was massive, 
including a landmark proposal by Latin American countries in 
February 1990 —the first full draft of an agreement comprising 34 
articles and nineteen pages— which provided language to much of the 
then emerging agreement and did much to focus the discussion on 
crucial elements of the negotiations such as the mechanics of 
liberalization and the treatment of developing countries. Regionally, 
the first Latin American country to join in a free trade agreement 
covering services trade was Mexico who did so even before the GATS 
Agreement was sealed, signed and delivered, by being a party to the 
Services in Regional Agreements between Latin American and developed countries 
8 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) which entered into force a full year before the 
WTO and GATS. NAFTA was an innovation in many ways and, in addition to being the first 
plurilateral trade agreement to include services ever, was also the first such agreement to be 
concluded between the developed and the developing world. It would in effect inaugurate a trend 
which continues to evolve in the region, as countries continue to seek out agreements with 
developed partners. Since 1994, the region has also been involved in the so-called Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, a hemispheric project involving 34 countries from Argentina 
to Canada (with the exception of Cuba), something which eleven years later looks more like the 
past than the future despite a considerable body of literature and negotiating history. 
Latin American countries continue to seek out partners in the developed world for trade in 
services pacts and so far the following agreements have been concluded, chronologically by 
signature and entry into force: NAFTA (1992-1994), Mexico-EU (2000-2000), Mexico-EFTA 
(2000-2001), Chile-EU (2002), Chile-US (2003-2004), Chile-EFTA (2003-2004), Mexico-Japan 
(2004-2005) and Peru-US (2005). Negotiations are still underway between the European Union1 
and Mercosul as well as the Andean Community, and between the US and Colombia and Ecuador. 
Finally, a Chile-Japan Study Group was established in November 2004 and one year later the 
leaders of the two countries decided to launch negotiations on a so-called "Japan-Chile Economic 
Partnership Agreement / Free Trade Agreement". 
This paper aims to review the existing trade in services agreements between Latin American 
countries and developed country partners with a view to detailing, comparing and drawing related 
conclusions as to their similarities and differences in relation to a set of the following five crucial 
elements: definition and coverage, core principles, mechanics of liberalization, domestic regulation 
and sectoral purview. The initial focus of the paper will be on the world’s first multilateral pact on 
trade in services, the GATS, whence emanates much of what is now rule and principle in that trade. 
The remaining sections will then look, at a high level of detail, at the approaches and provisions 
embodied in the existing trade in services pacts between Latin American countries and developed 
trading partners. The paper will also analyze the economic, juridical and policy consequences of 
the different approaches and provisions, finishing with a section on costs and benefits followed by 
the lessons to be drawn from the exercise. 
                                                     
1
 The first services offers were made in 1999. 
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I. WTO: The Advent of the GATS 
The GATS is a general agreement just as the Gatt itself. The 
first multilateral instrument for trade in goods, the "Gatt 1947", signed 
on 30 October 1947, had 38 articles distributed in 4 parts and 9 
annexes (none of which was of a sectoral nature). The first multilateral 
instrument for trade in services, the GATS, in force since 1 January 
1995, contains 29 articles distributed in 6 parts, in addition to 6 
annexes of which 4 have a sectoral nature (financial, 
telecommunication, air transport and maritime transport services). The 
Gatt-47 evolved during more than five decades and was replaced by 
Gatt-94 as a result of the Uruguay Round. The GATS is now eleven 
years old.  
A. Definition and Coverage 
The GATS does not contain a definition of the term "service" as 
such. In its Article I, it defines "services" to include "any service in 
any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority" while its article on definitions (Article XXVIII) is silent on 
the term. The closest to a definition, therefore, is a reference to the 
sectors that may be included in the broad services universe alongside a 
carve-out for services which are defined in the following item in the 
same article as services which are "supplied neither on a commercial 
basis nor in competition with one or more services suppliers".2  
                                                     
2
 Article I:3(c) of the GATS. 
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Article I defines what is "trade in services" in terms of four modes of supply – namely: (1) cross-
border supply where the service itself moves from the territory of one member to another (crucial 
for 
transport and telecommunication services); (2) consumption abroad where the consumer moves to 
the territory where the service is being supplied (crucial for tourism services); (3) commercial 
presence where the service supplier establishes itself overseas to supply services (crucial for any 
service); (4) presence of natural persons where the service supplier is a natural person and moves to 
the country where the service is to be supplied (crucial for consultancy and other services).3 The 
GATS therefore includes all forms of international commercialization of services, not only the 
form analogous to what has been known as trade in goods - the cross-border supply - but also three 
other forms which go beyond the service itself to involve the movement of consumers, investment 
and natural persons.  
Article XXVIII(a) includes all types of measures under the purview of the agreement, 
whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action or "any 
other form" while its alinea (c) defines measures "affecting trade in services" to include the 
purchase, payment or use of a service, the access to and use of services offered to the public 
generally and the presence of persons in the consuming country. To complete a remarkably vast 
coverage, Article I:3(a) defines "measures by Members" as measures taken by any level of 
government (central, regional or local) and by non-governmental bodies via delegated powers.  
There are, of course, localized exclusions, exceptions and limiting provisions. As to sectors, 
the agreement excludes traffic rights and related services in air transport services4 and prudential 
measures in financial services.5 As to the movement of natural persons, the exclusions apply to 
employment, citizenship and residence "on a permanent basis".6 Article XIV, "General 
Exceptions", goes beyond the traditional exceptions for measures protecting public morals or order, 
human, animal or plant life or health to include measures that ensure the "equitable and effective 
imposition or collection of taxes" or that relate to the "avoidance of double taxation". An additional 
article, the XIV Bis, has exceptions relating to security. 
B. Core Principles 
There are three principles that are crucial for the primary objective of a free trade agreement 
such as the GATS: market access (Article XVI), national treatment (Article XVII) and most-
favored-nation (Article II). National treatment and m.f.n. treatment together comprise the 
traditional non-discrimination concept, common to the Gatt – whether between national and foreign 
services or suppliers or amongst all member countries of the GATS. Market access is captured in 
an article for which there is no general correspondence in the Gatt. 
There is no definition of market access as such but the related article lists a number of 
measures that are considered restrictions – five of a quantitative nature (quotas, monopolies or 
economic needs tests, value of service transactions or assets, total number of service operations or 
total quantity of service output, total number of natural persons, and the participation of foreign 
capital), two of a qualitative nature (specific types of legal entity or joint venture requirements). 
For national treatment, there is no list of agreed restrictions but the related article sets out that to 
meet the "treatment no less favorable" obligation treatment formally identical or formally different 
may be accorded as long as it does not modify "the conditions of competition in favor of [national] 
                                                     
3
 Article I:2 of the Gats. 
4
 Annex on Air Transport Services of the Gats, paragraph 2. 
5
 Annex on Financial Services, paragraph 2(a). 
6
 Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services under the Agreement, paragraph 2. 
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services or service suppliers".7 For m.f.n., there is the standard definition of treatment no less 
favorable than a Member "accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country".8 
Two aspects stand out in relation to the core principles of the GATS. First, the principles 
apply not only to services but to the suppliers of services as well. This is an important difference 
when compared with the application of the concept in trade in goods and introduces a number of 
sensitive issues such as the treatment of professionals or of investment made in connection to a 
commercial presence. Second, the principles apply not only to discriminatory measures against 
foreign services, suppliers and interests but also to non-discriminatory measures which may also 
affect significantly the supply of services in a particular market. Four of the measures listed as 
market access limitations in Article XVI, in addition to being quantitative in nature, are also non-
discriminatory in their application – i.e., are applied in the same fashion in the market to both 
national and foreign service and service suppliers.  
The GATS also has a number of traditional rules and principles, common to the multilateral 
trading system since its inception: transparency (Article III), economic integration (Article V), 
restrictions to safeguard the balance of payment (Article XII) and dispute settlement and 
enforcement (Article XXIII). Other innovative principles will be addressed below.  
C. Mechanisms of Liberalization 
In order to make acceptable the application of the ambitious core principles of the 
agreement, it was imperative in the negotiations to find the means to qualify and attenuate it, so 
that member countries could join in progressively. A mechanism of liberalization was devised so as 
to permit countries to commit in some and not all sectors and in some and not in all modes of 
supply. The agreement made market access and national treatment negotiated principles – i.e., 
principles whose application would be a matter of negotiation and not of automatic application.  
Thus, even though the principles are ambitious, their application is tempered by the 
conditions countries are able to maintain on the basis of their negotiations with trading partners. In 
addition, countries can “choose” not to bind modes of supply – i.e., to leave them unbound. All of 
these indications are supposed to be included in the so-called “Schedules of Specific 
Commitments” where, therefore, countries will include the sectors and sub-sectors and, for each of 
these, indicate, for each of the modes of supply, the measures it binds in relation to market access 
and national treatment. If it chooses not to bind a particular mode of supply for a particular sub-
sector for either market access or national treatment, it can simply inscribe the word “unbound”. 
The list of sectors in the offers and the schedule of commitments is therefore “positive” since 
countries include only the ones where some level of commitment will positively apply. Negative 
lists, on the contrary, indicate only the sectors where there are remaining restrictions: sectors not 
mentioned are to be considered fully liberalized. In addition to the positive list of sectors, countries 
have the right under the GATS to keep their restrictions and ultimately retain the option to bind 
them or not. It should be noted that this relatively high level of flexibility in the GATS 
liberalization process, as attractive and necessary as it was during the Uruguay Round to ensure 
that the agreement came about, is still fully dependant on the negotiating power of member 
countries. The determination of the sectors a country ultimately includes in its schedule will be the 
result of negotiations and the capacity of the country in question to do or not do as trading partners 
demand. In other words, the pressure of the major developed trading partners is perhaps a much 
                                                     
7
 Article XVII:2 and 3 of the Gats. 
8
 Article II:1 of the Gats. 
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more important determining factor as to the final sectoral make-up of a developing country 
schedule than any of the flexibilities available in the agreement. 
Finally, another part and parcel of the mechanics of liberalization imbedded in the GATS is 
the principle of the most-favored-nation (m.f.n.) treatment. Despite great difficulties in providing 
for non-discrimination in some sectors,9 it was possible to include the principle in the agreement 
but only once countries agreed to accept an annex on m.f.n. exceptions. The annex provided for a 
one-shot opportunity for countries to lodge exceptions and since then reviews are supposed to 
occur every five years with a view to eliminating remaining exceptions.  
D. Regulatory Situation 
The success of the negotiations that created the GATS also owed much to the capacity on the 
part of negotiators to recognize important realities of trade in services and to adapt them to the 
emerging multilateral regime then under negotiation. That was the case with a number of domestic 
regulation issues, most of which were ultimately addressed in Article VI of the agreement. The 
importance of such an article cannot be overemphasized given the incidence of domestic measures 
in all the activities covered by the GATS. Aspects of regulation that may be the object of mutual 
recognition agreements were also dealt with in the agreement by means of a specific provision, 
Article VII, fully devoted to the subject.  
Article VI starts off addressing governance issues. Thus the first paragraph deals with the 
need to ensure the reasonable, objective and impartial administration of relevant measures while 
the second calls on members to maintain or institute judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or 
procedures for necessary reviews and appropriate remedies. To provide for all that is set out in 
those paragraphs is indeed an ambitious proposition which is why a clarification is made that 
countries are not effectively obliged to comply where their "constitutional structure or the nature of 
[their] legal system" does not permit them to do so. The third paragraph then touches on 
applications for licenses and their disciplines. 
Perhaps the main contribution by Article VI was its paragraph 4 where qualification 
requirements, technical standards and licensing requirements– all items of great importance in the 
commercialization of services nationally and internationally – were singled out as potential barriers 
to trade and linked to three main minimal complying prerequisites: being based on objective and 
transparent criteria, not being more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service 
and, for licenses, that the procedures avoid being themselves a restriction on the supply of the 
service. The Council for Trade in Services has since the entry into force of the agreement pursued 
work relating to the development of disciplines and the improvement of the article itself.  
E. Sectors 
Another important recognition embodied in the GATS relates to the need for provisions that 
address specific aspects of certain sectors. The agreement thus has sectoral annexes – on air 
transport services, financial services and telecommunications – whose main objective is to clarify 
and complement framework provisions – and not to replace them as liberalization instruments. 
These annexes were the result of a "sectoral testing exercise" during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations whereby the core principles of the agreement were "tested" in many sectors so as to 
ascertain the need for special sectoral provisions. In most cases, there were no major 
                                                     
9
  Transport sectors, particularly air transport, tend to have discriminatory arrangements in place which make the application of m.f.n. 
undesirable if not simply infeasible. 
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inconsistencies between what could be envisaged as trade in services liberalization in general and 
in any particular sector. Clarifications served to emphasize sectoral aspects that for many reasons 
needed emphasis – such as the case of the prudential carve-out in financial services, or the 
exclusion of traffic rights and related services in the air transport services sector. Unlike 
agreements that would follow, GATS had no stand-alone agreement for any sector at the end of the 
negotiations.
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II. Latin American Bilaterals with 
Developed Trading Partners  
Since NAFTA entered into force in 1994 thus becoming the first 
free trade agreement involving developed and developing countries to 
contain provisions on trade in services in the world, other agreements 
were concluded in the Americas that followed that trend. All Latin 
American countries are members of at least one bilateral or regional 
agreement regarding services trade, in addition to being members of 
the WTO and, therefore, subject to the disciplines of GATS. In all 
agreements negotiated between Latin American countries and 
developed trading partners, the services dossier was included.  
A. Agreements with the United States 
Agreements concluded with the United States have followed the 
NAFTA model inasmuch as possible. There are variations across 
trading partners but generally the structure and the mechanics of the 
U.S. bilaterals have a straight-forward NAFTA cast —both in Latin 
America as elsewhere. Thus, in most cases there are chapters like 
NAFTA's Chapter XI on Investment, Chapter XII on Cross-Border 
Trade in Services, Chapter XIII on Telecommunications, Chapter XIV 
on Financial Services and Chapter XVI on the Temporary Entry for 
Business Persons. As well, other chapters that touch on services 
matters —notably those relating to norms, government procurement, 
intellectual property, competition policy, monopolies and state 
enterprises— have also been included in subsequent U.S. 
bilaterals. 
Services in Regional Agreements between Latin American and developed countries 
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Not all services-related chapters in NAFTA are effectively as free-trade inducing as many 
believe. In some cases, entire sectors were virtually excluded from the scope of application of the 
agreement: the case of air transport services, basic telecommunications and maritime transport. In 
other cases, provisions limited the scope of application of crucial issues such as the case of the 
temporary movement of natural persons which is tailored only for business persons. In other cases, 
NAFTA did go beyond its predecessor agreement, the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA), providing for some liberalization in sensitive segments such as land transport services 
(excluded in the bilateral agreement) or intellectual property. Perhaps the best example of a free-
trade bias in NAFTA was given in the financial services sector by means of a chapter that, in 
addition to providing market opening innovations, effectively constituted a stand-alone agreement. 
Besides Mexico, other Latin American countries to have concluded agreements with the U.S. 
are Chile, the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic —the latter two in the 
context of one agreement referred to as U.S.-CAFTA-DR. Chile's agreement entered into force in 
2004 while the CAFTA-DR deal should enter into force sometime in 2006. The U.S. is currently 
negotiating individually with three Andean countries— Peru, Colombia and Ecuador, having 
already concluded the negotiations with Peru on December 7th, 2005. The Peruvian draft agreement 
reads as a multiparty arrangement since Colombia and Ecuador have also been a part of the 
negotiation and is currently, at the time of drafting of the present study, undergoing a legal review 
that should, among other things, modify it to reflect the bilateral understanding between Peru and 
the US. 
Common aspects to NAFTA and the US agreements with Chile, CAFTA-DR and Peru 
include the following:  
• They all have the same chapters generally, the same overall structure and the same 
liberalization mechanism; 
• The Chapter on Cross-border trade in services relates to modes 1, 2 and 4, with mode 3 
being treated in a separate chapter on investment (for all investment, goods and services); 
there is also a chapter on the temporary movement of business persons which deals with 
procedures relating to mode 4; 
• The definition and coverage extend to measures at the central and regional levels of 
government; financial services and telecoms have their own chapters as well; air transport 
services are excluded with the exception of aircraft repair and maintenance services and 
specialty services;  
• The core principles for the NAFTA-type agreements are national treatment, most-
favored-nation treatment and market access, alongside a principle called "local presence" 
which prohibits a duty of establishment as a pre-condition for the supply of cross-border 
services;  
• They all have similar transparency, domestic regulation, mutual recognition, transfer of 
payments and denial of benefits provisions.  
− On domestic regulation, they all borrow from only two of the six paragraphs of GATS 
Article VI; 
− On transparency, all agreements have a specific chapter on the matter in addition to an 
article on "transparency in development and application of regulations"; 
− On governance issues such as administrative proceedings and review and appeal, all 
agreements have articles in the transparency-specific chapter; 
CEPAL – SERIE Comercio internacional  N° 71 
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• The mechanics of liberalization is based on the lodging of measures that do not conform 
to the principles of national treatment, most-favored-nation, market access and local 
presence;10  
− the list is negative: only sectors or sub-sectors that have restrictions in place appear on 
it, all the rest being taken for liberalized;  
− any liberalizing changes in regulation are immediately bound under the agreement (a 
"ratcheting mechanism"); 
• There is a commitment to consult annually to review the implementation of the chapter 
and "other issues of mutual interest";  
• The cross-border chapter contains an annex on professional services which deals with 
standards, temporary licensing and review; 
• There are provisions on express delivery services —whether in an annex or within an 
article entitled "Specific Commitments"; 
Even though the similarities are clearly strong, it would be fallacious to think that there are 
no significant differences between NAFTA and its follower agreements. In fact, there are important 
differences regarding issues that have been identified as of particular interest to developing 
countries in general —and certainly to those in Latin America.  
The discussion of specific sectoral differences between NAFTA and its follower-agreements 
in Latin America will be left for later in the present study. As can be seen in the table below, 
however, there are important general differences both between NAFTA and its follower 
agreements as well as between the followers themselves regarding a number of elements. The table 
thus compares all Latin American NAFTA-type agreements in accordance with specific differing 
elements and whether these elements add (+) or subtract (-) from NAFTA provisions. 
The following should be highlighted from the above findings:  
• The NAFTA-plus elements relate mostly to clarifications and/or complementations 
included in specific provisions —as exemplified by the Articles on domestic regulation 
and mutual recognition; 
• Another NAFTA-plus element refers to the inclusion of a chapter on electronic commerce 
—issue that was non-existent as such as the time of drafting of NAFTA; 
• The NAFTA-minus elements refer to issues that are crucially important for developing 
countries: the temporary entry of natural, and not only business persons; and, the 
elimination of citizenship and permanent residency requirements, particularly with 
respect to professional services. 
 
                                                     
10
  The chapters on investment and on financial services have more principles against which parties can lodge reservations: 
establishment of financial institutions, cross-border trade, new financial services and data processing and senior management and 
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Table 1 
NAFTA-TYPE AGREEMENTS: PLUS OR MINUS 
ELEMENT NAFTA CHILE-US CAFTA-DR-US PERU-US 





Chapter 16 and 
annexes on business 
visitors, traders and 
investors, intra-
corporate transferees 




and its annexes. 
NAFTA-minus: 
There is no such 
chapter 
NAFTA-minus: 




    
Standard of 
Treatment 
Article 1204 grants the 
best of treatment 
between national 
treatment and mfn 
NAFTA-minus: 
There is no such 
principle 
NAFTA-minus: 
As in Chile-US 
NAFTA-minus: 
As in Chile-US 
Market Access There is no such 






Article 11.4 borrows 
from Gats XVI but 
nothing on capital 
participation. 
NAFTA-plus: 
As in Chile-US 
NAFTA-plus: 
As in Chile-US 





Article 1210 commits to 
eliminating them within 
2 years for professional 
services (including the 
right to retaliate with 
equivalent restrictions) 
and to "determining the 
feasibility of removing" 
them for other service 
sectors. 
NAFTA-minus: 
Article 11.10 on 
implementation has a 
similar NAFTA 1210:4 
on the feasibility of 
removal but nothing 
as committed as 
NAFTA 1210:3 on 
professional services 
NAFTA-minus: 












There is a side letter 
committing  the US 
to "initiate a review" 
(and not eliminate) 
of state-level 
measures in a 
number of states on 
citizenship or 
residency applied to 




There is no provisions 
dealing with the matter 
NAFTA-plus: 
Chapter 15 is devoted 
to it, prohibiting 
customs duties or 
discrimination but 
permitting  restrictions 
to be scheduled; no 






Treatment of Regulation 
Requirements There is no domestic 
regulation article. Article 
1210:1 on licensing and 
certification 
corresponds to Gats 
VI:4 and 1210:2 to Gats 
VII:1 and 2. 
NAFTA-plus: 
Article 11.8:1 and 2 
correspond to Gats 
VI:3 and 4 while 
Article 11:9 tracks 
broadly with Gats 
Article VII, including 
no obligation on non-
Parties. 
NAFTA-plus: 
As in Chile-US 
NAFTA-plus: 
As in Chile-US 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
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III. Agreements with the European 
Union 
In addition to its own internal process of services liberalization, 
the EU is an important protagonist in services regionalism. In Latin 
America, it has concluded two full-fledged FTAs on services —one 
with Chile, another with Mexico— and continues to pursue an 
intensive agenda in that respect in the region, including inter-regional 
efforts with Mercosul and the Andean Community. The EU has also 
delved into services in other regions of the world but the Chilean and 
Mexican agreements are by far the most ambitious insofar as effective 
liberalization is concerned. For example, in both the association 
agreements with the so-called Mediterranean countries (MED) 
(Tunisia, Israel, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Authority) and the Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa (fully in force since May 
2004), the EU has focused on economic cooperation in a wide range of 
service sectors as opposed to liberalization. 
The agreement with Mexico is referred to as the "Economic 
Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement" and 
has become known as the "Global Agreement". It was signed on 8 
December 1997 and entered into force on 1 October 2000. Services 
liberalization effectively started on 1 March 2001, according to a 
decision (2/2001) adopted on February of that year), with a standstill 
of discriminatory measures. The agreement is now in its second phase 
when a substantial portion of restrictions is supposed to be eliminated 
(missed the March 2005 deadline) and a scheduled established for the  
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remaining barriers until 2011. The agreement borrows from both the GATS and the NAFTA, in 
addition to innovating in some aspects.  
The EU-Chile Association Agreement was signed on November 2002 and has been 
provisionally in effect since 1 February 2003. It also covers a political dialog and cooperation 
issues but the liberalization part is the most ambitious. Trade in Services is covered in Part IV, 
Title III which also covers non-services-related establishment (Chapter III). Unlike NAFTA, 
therefore, all services investment is dealt with under trade in services. A review is foreseen every 
three years to oversee the implementation of the service provisions and make recommendations to 
the Association Council. The main commonalities between the Chile-EU Association Agreement 
and the Mexico-EU Global Agreement insofar as services are concerned are the following: 
• On definition and coverage, both agreements consider as a "service supplier" a "person" 
and there are no national majority rules applicable to management or capital participation. 
The language is a little different in each case but this "rule of origin" is liberal in both 
cases, therefore; 
− Both agreements are based on four modes of supply as in the GATS; 
− Both agreements exclude subsidies, audiovisual services and national maritime 
cabotage, in addition to air transport services directly related to the exercise of traffic 
rights; 
− Both agreements include measures at all levels of government, including local; 
− Both clarify that a legal person from the second party must have substantive business 
operations in the first party in order to be considered a first party legal person; 
• On core principles, both agreements borrow significantly from GATS in the language of 
the three main liberalization articles: market access and national treatment and most-
favored-nation; 
• On sectors, both agreements have specific provisions dealing with financial services (a 
chapter in both cases), as well as international maritime transport services and 
telecommunication services (chapters and sections).  
It is interesting to note, however, that despite a higher level of ambition than what is 
characteristic in North-South agreements on services liberalization, there may be more differences 
between the Mexico-EU and the Chile-EU agreements than similarities.  
The table below indicates the main differing elements, explains their application in each case 
and illustrates which agreement, in each case, would be more liberal in its outlook. As a general 
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Table 2 
EU-TYPE AGREEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: MAIN DIFFERENCES AND OUTLOOK 
ELEMENT MEXICO-EU CHILE-EU MORE LIBERAL 
Definition and 
coverage 
   
Regulatory Carve-
out 
Article 8 carves out non-
discriminatory regulations 
No such carve-out Chile-EU 
Electronic 
Commerce 
Nothing on the subject Recognition of the importance but 




   
Standstill and 
deadline 
Initially for three years, followed 
by phasing-out schedule in ten 
years. 
None Mexico-EU 
List of Sectors Negative Positive Mexico-EU 
Review Council can change calendar and 
lists anytime 
Review every three years for more 
liberalization in general and in two 
years to consider (not liberalize) 
mode 4. 




Nothing on the subject Under domestic regulation, 
periodic consultations on 





   
Transparency Principle not included Principle included under services 
plus a general obligation 
Chile-EU 
Governance Nothing on reviews, remedies, 
treatment of applications 
Disciplines on application for 
licenses and certification but in 
Mutual Recognition article 
Chile-EU 
Requirements Nothing on the subject As Gats VI:4 Chile-EU 
Recognition Commitment: no later than 3 
years, establish the steps to 
engage in such agreements 
Only encouragement Mexico-EU 
Sectors    
Maritime Transport Commitment to unrestricted 
market access and non-
discrimination, as well as access 
to ports, infrastructure, etc. 
Same commitment as Mexico-EU 
but goes further to clarify the 
measure it will not introduce, 
prohibit or abolish. 
Chile-EU 
Financial Services Details establishment and cross-
border 
According to 4 modes Chile-EU 
 National Treatment simpler National treatment as in the Gats: 
formally identical, conditions of 
competition, etc. 
Chile-EU 
 Most-favored nation – has the 
principle 
There is no such principle Mexico-EU 
 Carve-outs: prudential but also 
blanket carve-out for non-
discriminatory measures 
Only prudential carve-out Chile-EU 
 New financial services – as 
permitted domestically 
Only when new law or modification 
of a law is not necessary 
Mexico-EU 
 Recognition – nothing on the 
subject 
Article on the subject Chile-EU 
Telecommunications No disciplines on the sector Commitments based on WTO 
Reference Paper 
Chile-EU 
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IV. Agreements with Japan 
The only existing agreement between Japan and any Latin 
American country, including provisions on trade in services, is the 
"Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the 
Strengthening of the Economic Partnership" signed on 17 September 
2004 and entered into force on 1st April 2005. 
The agreement adopts the NAFTA approach, the main 
commonalities being the following: 
• Separate Chapters on Investment and Cross-Border Supply 
of Services; 
• Separate Chapters for Financial Services; 
• Separate Chapters for the Temporary Movement of Business 
Persons; 
• Possibility of scheduling reservations in regards to all core 
liberalization principles; 
• Negative list approach to scheduling. 
There are also important differences which will be reviewed in 
detail and comparatively in tables 3-7 below. The most important 
broader differences are the following: 
• Lack of Chapter on Telecommunication Services; 
• Lack of Market Access article in the cross-border chapter 
unlike US bilaterals; 
• No liberalization provisions as such for financial services; 
• A commitment to include measures relating to local 
government.
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V. Comparing Provisions 
A. Definition and Coverage 
Defining trade in services was a difficult matter already in the 
Uruguay Round when the GATS was born. Many of the subsequent 
agreements that followed did not choose to define the concept but just 
adopt or adapt GATS’ approach to the issue: relying on four modes of 
supply as the operational way to frame the commercial universe of the 
agreement. The Latin American agreements with the US adopted 
NAFTA’s approach to "cross-border trade" where modes 1, 2 and 4 are 
covered in one chapter while mode 3 in another. Other definitions 
would then have a stronger bearing on what would effectively be the 
agreement’s rule of origin.  
The most "defining" definition of all is the one relating to 
persons. While in NAFTA "person" refers to both natural persons and 
enterprises sufficing for them to be merely present in one of the 
Parties, the GATS limits the definition of "juridical person of another 
Member" to national majority ownership and control. In other words, 
while according to NAFTA Citibank established in Canada would be 
considered a US-origin supplier just by virtue of being a US 
enterprise, the same Citibank would have to have a majority 
ownership and control by Americans as well in order to qualify as a 
US supplier in Canada according to the GATS. This is a crucial place, 
therefore, where the GATS tends to be much more restrictive than 
NAFTA and its follower agreements.  
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The US Latin American bilaterals follow NAFTA and have therefore a fairly open rule of 
origin for firms. It is interesting to note, however, that the EC Latin American bilaterals, despite 
following GATS in a number of important ways, deviate from the WTO Agreement in this 
particular aspect. Both the Mexico-EU and the Chile-EU bilaterals adopt definitions which also 
focus on persons that are merely "set up in accordance with the laws of"11 or "constituted or 
otherwise organized under the law of"12 one of the Parties.  
As to the coverage, all agreements are reasonably broad regarding measures covered. Thus, 
both NAFTA and its type agreements, as well as GATS and its type agreements, apply to all kinds 
of measures that affect trade in services, including measures by non-governmental bodies. The 
difference begins in terms of level of government covered by the agreements. The US Latin 
American agreements, for example, exclude measures taken by local governments from the 
purview of the agreements while the EU counterparts include them. Services supplied by the 
government are fully excluded from all agreements, with a particular emphasis on prudential 
measures in the financial services sector. It is also a widespread practice to exclude measures 
relating to immigration, citizenship, residency and employment from the agreements, the difference 
residing at times in review or liberalization commitments with respect to one of more of these 
elements. In all Latin American bilaterals with developed countries, subsidies are also excluded 
from the purview of the agreement while government procurement is not only included as it is 
devoted a full title (a chapter congregating a number of articles). 
As to sectoral exclusions, the US Latin American bilaterals follow NAFTA and exclude air 
transport services (except for aircraft repair and maintenance and specialty services). The EU 
counterparts also exclude these services and go further to exclude audiovisual services, maritime 
cabotage, government procurement and subsidies as well. Finally, with respect to natural persons, 
NAFTA is limited to business persons while GATS applies to all categories of natural persons. US 
Latin American bilaterals have fared even worse than NAFTA at this subject while the EU 
counterparts managed to maintain a broader coverage —much as in GATS. It should be noted that 
by virtue of reservations relating to existing and future measures, parties to agreements, particularly 
the US bilaterals, have been able to exclude full sectors from any obligation. NAFTA and US 
bilaterals, for example, always exclude maritime transport services in the US annexes.13 
 
 
                                                     
11
 Article 3(e) of Chapter I of Title II on Trade in Services of the Mexico-EU Agreement. 
12
 Article 96(f) of the Chile-EU Agreement. 
13
 As to thematic exclusions, it is interesting to note that neither US nor EU bilaterals with the region include disciplines on subsidies 
or safeguards relating to services —whether in services-related chapters or elsewhere. In contrast, insofar as government 
procurement is concerned, all such bilaterals include them, but in separate chapters that cover both goods and services.  
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Table 3 
SCOREBOARD: DEFINITION AND COVERAGE 
ITEM US BILATERALS EU BILATERALS JAPAN BILATERALS 
Definition of Trade in 
Services 
GATS-Minus 
Modes 1, 2 and 4 under Cross-
Border Chapter; mode 3 in 
different chapter applying to 
both goods and services. 
GATS-neutral 
Four modes as in the 
GATS 
GATS-Minus 
Similar to US Bilaterals 
“Person” GATS-Plus 
In terms of "nationals" and 
enterprises 
GATS-Plus 
In terms of natural 
and juridical but 





In terms of "persons" 
but also without national 
ownership and control 
majority rules. 
Denial of Benefits GATS-Plus 
Denial possible for non-Party 
firms owned or controlled by 
non-Party persons. Also, party 
firms that have no substantial 
business operations. 
GATS-Plus 
There is no denial of 
benefits provisions 
but definition is 
liberal. Firms in 
origin countries have 
to have substantial 
operations (no 
matter if they are 
non-Party) 
GATS-Plus 





All types, including "practice". 
GATS-Plus 
All types, including 
"any other form. 
GATS-neutral 
Same as EU bilaterals 
“Measures adopted 
or maintained by a 
[Party][Member]” 
GATS-Minus 
Exclude measures adopted or 
maintained at the local level of 
government from the application 
of the core liberalization 
principles; does not include best 
endeavors clause on 
compliance at all levels of 
government. 
GATS-neutral 
Specify that all levels 
of government are 
included and 
includes best 
endeavor clause on 
compliance.  
GATS-Minus 
Clarify in general article 
that local government is 
included for both 
countries; does not 
include best endeavors 
clause on compliance. 
Prudential Measures GATS-neutral 
Excluded by virtue of an 
exceptions article in a chapter 
on Financial Services. 
GATS-neutral 
Excluded by virtue of 
a specific article in a 
chapter on Financial 
Services. 
GATS-neutral 
Excluded by virtue of an 
exceptions article in a 





Related activities are excluded. 
GATS-neutral 
Related activities are 
excluded. 
GATS-neutral 
Related activities are 
excluded. 
Sectoral Exclusions GATS-Minus 
Exclude all air transport 
services, except repair and 
maintenance and specialized air 
services. 
GATS-Minus 
Exclude air transport 
services but includes 
selling and marketing 






Exclude air transport 
services but includes 
selling and marketing 




Natural Persons GATS-Minus 
Limited to temporary entry of 
business persons. 
GATS-neutral 
Cover full range of 
mode 4. 
GATS-Minus 
Limited to temporary 
entry of business 
persons. 
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B. Core Principles 
One of the most important differences between NAFTA and GATS was the absence of a 
market access article in NAFTA. The US Bilaterals that followed NAFTA, however, introduced 
such an article under the cross-border trade in services chapter, obviating the need for the NAFTA 
articles on quantitative restrictions and liberalization of non-discriminatory measures. Still on 
market access, NAFTA and the US Bilaterals go beyond GATS in two important aspects: first, an 
article on local presence prohibits the so-called "duty of establishment" for the supply of services; 
second, an article on performance requirements under the Investment Chapter prohibits them for 
both goods and services —an innovation in trade agreements. EU bilaterals do not have either 
prohibition, following GATS approach to market access and including all matters relating to the 
four modes of supply under one single Title of the overall agreement (Title II). 
On non-discrimination, all agreements have provisions on national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment. There are important differences in the language, however, particularly in 
the case of national treatment. NAFTA, in addition, had a provision which linked the two types of 
non-discrimination —national treatment and most-favored-nation— to a third concept: that of 
"standard of treatment" whereby parties to the agreement are ensured that they will get the best 
treatment available —whether via non-discrimination between nationals and foreigners (national 
treatment) or via non-discrimination between other parties (most-favored-nation).  
The table below assembles the main aspects regarding core principles and details their 
salient features so as to facilitate comparisons and perspectives in relation to GATS provisions. 
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Table 4 
SCOREBOARD: CORE PRINCIPLES 





Market Access GATS-Minus 





to all modes. 
GATS-Minus 
Same as US 
bilaterals 
Local Presence GATS-Plus 
Have article that prohibits requirement to 
establishment for the supply of cross-border services; 
reservations in schedules are possible. 
GATS-neutral 
Silent on the 
matter 
GATS-Plus 





Have article under investment chapter that lists and 
prohibits a number of TRIMs for both goods and 
services; reservations in schedules are possible. 
GATS-neutral 
Silent on the 
matter 
GATS-Plus 
Same as US 
Bilaterals 
Senior Management and 
Boards of Directors 
GATS-Plus 
Have article under investment chapter providing for 
prohibition on national preference for senior 
management but allows national majority on board of 
directors; reservations in schedules are possible. 
GATS-neutral 
Silent on the 
matter 
GATS-Plus 
Same as US 
Bilaterals 
Non-Discrimination 
National Treatment GATS-Minus 
Clarify that "regionally" (other than central or federal) 
treatment has to be the same as accorded to national 
suppliers but there is a carve-out from liberalization 



















No reference to according national treatment via 
treatment formally identical or different depending on 
whether conditions of competition are modified. Same 










Same as US 
Bilaterals. 
Most-favored-nation GATS-neutral 
Traditional definition extending best treatment granted 
to non-Parties (see part below regarding mechanics of 
liberalization). 
GATS-neutral 




Same as US 
Bilaterals 
Standard of Treatment GATS-neutral 
Did not include NAFTA provision which foresaw the 
better treatment between national treatment and m.f.n.  
GATS-neutral 




Silent on the 
matter 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
C. Mechanism of Liberalization 
All US and EU bilaterals have important similarities in terms of mechanisms of 
liberalization. The notion of lodging reservations or limitations to the application of liberalization 
principles, alongside the possibility to bind measures or regulatory situations, is common in all 
bilaterals here in question. Also, the inclusion of non-discriminatory measures as liberalization 
targets is a feature of most of these agreements. They all deal with both quantitative and qualitative 
measures as well.  
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There are many differences, however. For example, regarding reservations or limitations, the 
Mexico-EU Agreement provides for a "regulatory carve-out"14 for non-discriminatory measures 
which in fact allows a Party to "regulate…in so far as regulations do not discriminate against 
services and service suppliers of the other Party". On the other hand, the same agreement also 
provides for a standstill regarding discriminatory measures and for the elimination of all remaining 
discrimination within ten years. In addition, there are differences as to the principles against which 
Parties may lodge reservations/limitations or whether future measures may also be the subject of 
scheduling. There are differences in the types of lists foreseen for sectoral scheduling: a positive 
vs. a negative listing depending on whether Parties list sectors they commit to liberalize or not 
liberalize. The level of binding is another crucial difference since in some cases parties have to 
bind the totality of their regulatory situation for all sectors included in the agreement while in 
others a partial binding is acceptable. Finally, the deadlines for accomplishing certain objectives  
—particularly liberalization itself— can vary, when they exist at all.  
The Mexico-EU agreement is perhaps the most peculiar agreement in regards to mechanics 
of liberalization. While it is very ambitious in respect to non-discriminatory measures where it 
commits to an immediate standstill and to a "decision providing for the elimination of substantially 
all remaining discrimination"15 within a "transitional period of ten years",16 it also provides for an 
unprecedented carve-out for non-discriminatory measures —presumably not applicable to the non-
discriminatory measures listed as restrictive measures under the article on market access.  
The table below details, explains and compares the main elements regarding the mechanism 
of  liberalization.
                                                     
14
 Article 8 of the Mercosul-EU Global Agreement. 
15
 Article 7:3 of the Decision n. 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council. 
16
 Article 7:3(a) of the Decision n. 2/2001 of the EU-Mexico Joint Council. 
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Table 5 
SCOREBOARD: MECHANICS OF LIBERALIZATION 
ITEM US BILATERALS EC BILATERALS  JAPAN 
BILATERALS 
Principles GATS-Plus 
Added market access principle to 
NAFTA-type agreement and kept 
local presence obligation. Through 
investment chapter, included 
obligations on performance 
requirements and senior management 
and board of directors. 
GATS-Minus 
Three core liberalization 
principles just as in GATS 
in the Mexico agreement 
but with carve-out for 
treatment granted under 
agreements notified under 
Article V. The Chile-EU 









Can be lodged, in addition to market 
access and national treatment, in 
relation to m.f.n. and local presence. 
Under investment chapter, can also 
be lodged in relation to performance 
requirements, senior management 
and board of directors. 
GATS-Minus 
Can be lodged in relation 
to market access and 
national treatment. M.f.n. 
is virtually free from any 











Parties can reserve their rights to 
maintain existing or adopt new and 
more restrictive measures in relation 
to all core liberalization principles. 
GATS-neutral 







The full regulatory situation of a party 
is to be bound; there is no possibility 
of leaving unbound. Transparency 
effect is full-fledged. 
GATS-neutral 
Chile-EU follows GATS 
approach: it is possible to 
leave sectors and modes 







There is no such provision. 
GATS-Plus 
Mexico-EU agreement 










There is no such provision. 
GATS-Minus 
Mexico-EU agreement 





There is no 
such 
provision. 
Lists of Sectors GATS-Plus 
Negative list approach: whatever is 
not listed is fully liberalized. 
GATS-neutral 
Positive list approach: 
whatever is not listed is 
virtually fully obligation-
free (m.f.n. still applies 









Implementation articles set out 
obligation to consult annually, or as 
otherwise agreed, to "review the 
implementation and consider other 
matters of mutual interest". Language 
is therefore not forcefully calling for 
more liberalization. GATS Article 
XIX:1 is more forceful on that aspect. 
US-Chile provides for consulting on 
the "feasibility of removing… 
citizenship and residency 
requirements". 
GATS-Plus 
Chile-EU provides for 
review within three years 
with a view to "further 
deepening liberalization".  
Mexico-EU provides for 
three-year deadline to 
agree on a decision to 
eliminate substantially all 
discrimination (not 
complied with) and on an 
overall ten-year deadline 






Source: Prepared by the author. 
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D. Regulatory Situation 
The treatment of domestic regulation varies across the US and EU Bilaterals with Latin 
America. In all four main aspects of domestic regulation —transparency, governance, 
requirements, and recognition— differences emerge. Those differences occur even among 
agreements "of the same type" as is the case in some aspects between the Mexico and Chile EU 
agreements.  
One major difference already between NAFTA itself and its follower-agreements, for 
example, is the absence of a domestic regulation article per se in NAFTA. Agreements have also 
tended to borrow specific provisions from NAFTA or GATS and rearrange them in some cases: for 
example, in the Chile-EU agreement, disciplines on the application of licenses and certifications 
appear under the mutual recognition article17 as opposed to the article on domestic regulation. 
NAFTA has in one article provisions regarding transparency (contact points, publication, 
notifications, etc.) and good governance (tribunals, prior comment, remedies, etc.) while US 
bilaterals separate them into transparency and domestic regulation articles, as do EU bilaterals as 
well. As to requirements, particularly those enunciated under Article VI:4 of the GATS, they 
appear in different places, sometimes with a slightly modified language; in the Mexico-EU 
agreement, there is no such provision. 
The table below details, explains and compares the main elements regarding the treatment of 
domestic regulation issues.  
Table 6 
SCOREBOARD: REGULATORY SITUATION 









Paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
GATS VI are under 
transparency article with 
more complete language 
(that applies to the overall 
agreement and not only to 
services). 
GATS-Minus 
There is no such reference. 
GATS-Plus 
Same as US bilaterals 
except that paragraphs 1 
and 2 of GATS VI appear in 
various articles of a chapter 
on implementation and 






GATS VI:2 is under 
transparency article with 
more complete language 
GATS-Minus 
There is no such reference. 
GATS-Plus 








Paragraph 3 of GATS 
Article VI are reproduced 
in domestic regulation 
article  
GATS-Minus 
Chile-EU GATS VI:3 under mutual 
recognition; Mexico-EU: nothing on 
this. 
GATS-neutral 




Same as GATS VI:4 
GATS-neutral 
Same as GATS VI:4 
GATS-Minus 
Same as GATS VI:4 but with 
briefer language (title of 
article is only licensing and 
certification) and no 
reference to GATS 
negotiations on the matter. 
Recognition GATS-neutral 
Article based on GATS VII 
GATS-Plus 
Chile-EU makes reference to 
GATS VII. Mexico-EU adds 
commitment to establish 
necessary steps to negotiate 
mutual recognition agreements 
within three years. 
GATS-Minus 
One paragraph referring to 
general obligation. 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
 
                                                     
17
 Article 103 of  the Chile-EU Agreement. 
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E. Sectors 
One of the primary differences regarding sectoral provisions between NAFTA and the GATS 
refers to whether or not they deal with liberalization per se. While in NAFTA, sectoral chapters or 
annexes provided for market opening via procedures, deadlines, standstill commitments and other 
instruments, in GATS sectoral annexes were not intended to provide for liberalization but only to 
clarify or complement provisions from the framework agreement —and nothing else. That 
difference, however, would not be retained in the subsequent agreements between Latin American 
countries and developed countries— particularly in the case of agreements concluded with the EU. 
All such bilateral agreements did include sectoral provisions of the "liberalization sort".  
All agreements tend to have sectoral provisions on financial services and 
telecommunications. While the EU agreements included provisions international maritime transport 
services, US agreements were much more focused on professional services and express delivery. 
Financial services is the sector that in almost all cases is dealt with a virtually stand-alone 
agreement— a chapter or annex that has a full-fledged set of rules and principles that can 
effectively replace any framework provision.  
The table below summarizes all the main saliencies and differences among the agreements in 
consideration. 




ITEM US BILATERALS EC BILATERALS  JAPAN BILATERALS 
Financial Services 
Instrument Gats-plus 
Agreements have specific 
chapter which is a “stand-
alone" agreement; all the same, 
some aspects are linked to 
other chapters. 
Gats-plus 
Both Mexico and 
Chile have separate 




The agreement has a 
separate chapter for the 
sector but simply 
legitimizes commitments 
made by the Parties 
under the Oecd and the 
Gats.  
Principles Gats-plus 
Adds new principles based on 
NAFTA such as the "right of 
establishment of financial 
institutions" and "new financial 
services". National treatment in 
NAFTA was more ambitious 
than in US bilaterals (no longer 
best treatment amongst that 
accorded across many states 
of the Union). 
Gats-minus 
Chile has a market 
access article and a 
more ambitious 
national treatment 





Agreement does not have 
traditional principles.  
 





No dispute settlement 
provisions 






expanding trade in 
financial services" 
within three years. 
Mexico-EU: annual 
meeting but no 




Specific Deadlines Gats-plus 
Chile committed to the opening 
of voluntary savings pension 








Reservations possible for all 
core liberalization principles.  
Gats-neutral 
While Chile-EU is a 
positive list, Mexico-
EU is a negative list. 
Gats-neutral 
None 
Prudential carve-out Gats-neutral 
All agreements have it. 
Gats-neutral 
All agreements have 
it. 
Gats-neutral 
All agreements have it. 
Telecomuunications    
Overall Outlook Gats-plus 
Provisions combine some 
access to and use of public 
telecommunication network 
provisions from Gats Annex 




Provisions tend to 
correspond, roughly, 
to the Wto-negotiated 
and optional reference 
paper 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on telecoms 
Transport Services    
General Treatment Gats-neutral 
No specific chapter.  
Gats-neutral 
No specific chapter.  
Gats-neutral 
No specific chapter.  
Air Transport Gats-minus 
No chapter or annex – merely 
an exclusionary provision under 
the article on scope and 
coverage. Do not Include 
selling and marketing or CRS 
services.  
Gats-neutral 
No chapter or annex – 
merely an 
exclusionary provision 
under the article on 
scope. Include selling 
and marketing or CRS 
services.  
Gats-neutral 
No chapter or annex – 
merely an exclusionary 
provision under the article 
on scope. Include selling 
and marketing or CRS 
services. 
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Table 7 (concluded) 
ITEM US BILATERALS EC BILATERALS  JAPAN BILATERALS 
Maritime Transport  
Gats-neutral 




devoted to the sector, 
ensuring that 
unrestricted access 
continues to be the 
norm. Exclusion of 
cabotage in scope. 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Other Transport Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Professional Services    
General Outlook Gats-plus 
Vary as to professions covered 
but "plus" elements regarding 
regulatory approaches, 
international standards (Chile), 
working groups (Peru), 
temporary licensing of 
engineers (Chile, Peru), future 






with the exception of 
brief mention under 
mutual recognition. 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Express Delivery    
General Outlook Gats-plus 
All US bilaterals have it while 
NAFTA had no such provisions; 
an annex in Chile agreement, 
as specific commitments in 
Cafta and Peru agreements 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Existing Access Gats-plus 
All express desire to maintain 
existing level of access; Cafta 
and Chile commit to a 
standstill; Peru commits only to 
consultations in case access 
level is questioned. 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Monopoly Gats-plus 
Cafta and Peru commit to avoid 
abuse of monopoly position. 
Chile and Cafta commit not to 
direct revenues from postal 
monopoly to benefit express 
delivery firms. 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Gats-neutral 
Nothing on the sector 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
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VI. Main Consequences of the 
Differences 
The comparisons made in the previous sections attest to the fact 
that differences can be deceiving. Generally, for example, the NAFTA 
approach to liberalization is often perceived as more ambitious than 
the approach embodied in the GATS but detailed comparisons 
demonstrate that matters are not so simple. There are bullish and 
bearish aspects to both approaches, particularly in their more recent 
incarnations as regional agreements. The Latin American pacts are 
illustrative of that. There are some important misconceptions when it 
comes to comparing agreements on trade in services. There are also 
some visible differences that say a lot about their aims and objectives.  
Thus, for example, the often perceived pro-liberalization bias of 
negative, as opposed to positive, lists may be too limiting in its 
outlook, particularly when additional elements are brought into the 
analysis —such as: the duration of the measure, the nature of the 
measures, whether parties can lodge reservations for future measures, 
whether reservations can be used to exclude sectors from the scope of 
application of the agreement, whether there are effective domestic 
regulation disciplines in the agreement or even if harmonization or 
mutual recognition are foreseen in it. NAFTA, for example, excluded 
the basic telecommunication sector via party schedules while the US 
excluded maritime transport services by stating it in its own schedule. 
Canada also excluded audiovisual services in its NAFTA schedule. 
Another NAFTA characteristic which was adopted in US Bilaterals in 
Latin America was the exclusion of measures at the local level of 
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government, effectively carving-out a potentially significant realm of restrictive regulation from the 
scope of those agreements.  
The recourse to reservations for future measures, a particularity of NAFTA and subsequent 
US bilaterals, can at times be more sweeping (since it is so general and open-ended) than a specific 
bound commitment that has no "future cover" and remains a target for future liberalization. In other 
words, the negative vs. positive aspect of scheduling lists simply cannot be considered in isolation 
lest it confuses more than clarifies the liberalization drive of trade in services agreements. Of the 
agreements herein considered, only Chile-EU adopts positive lists, following GATS Article XX. As 
seen above (table 2), that agreement tends to be more GATS+ than its Mexican counterpart by 
virtue of a number of other characteristics that can be equally or even more important than just the 
form of listing commitments. Negative listing does not "liberalize more" because liberalization 
hinges on many other aspects of an agreement. Clearly, it tends to be more transparent than positive 
listing but that is quite a different matter from liberalization per se. 
Another important misconception refers to rules and principles. Much has been said about 
the pro-liberalization innovations that prohibited the duty of establishment (local presence articles 
in  NAFTA and US bilaterals) or that introduced, albeit under investment provisions, the 
prohibition of performance requirements (articles with the same name in NAFTA and US 
bilaterals). Principles such as these are never "general obligations", however —i.e., obligations 
which imply automatic compliance and are not subject to negotiations. These principles, inasmuch 
as they are ambitious and point to areas where countries do tend to be restrictive in their regulatory 
regime, are normally principles against which parties can lodge reservations. The ambition of the 
articles, therefore, is highly tempered by the recourse parties can have, and often do, to scheduled 
reservations and/or limitations.  
Once again, of the Latin American agreements herein considered, only the Chile-EU has no 
provisions on local presence or performance requirements. Yet, even in the absence of specific 
provisions on those two matters, the GATS approach still requires the scheduling of related 
measures. If a country applies national content or trade balancing provisions in services, GATS and 
its follower-agreements require scheduling of those measures anyway. The added flexibility with 
the GATS approach is not in not having the articles or even in not prohibiting explicitly the 
measures: it is in "permitting" (if the country has any bargaining power to speak of) non-binding by 
modes of supply which in effect allows countries to keep those matters away from the negotiating 
table.  
There are additional visible characteristics that underpin some of the common 
misconceptions regarding pacts on trade in services. The question of deadlines, for example, is one 
of them. The fact is that having a temporal horizon to the total liberalization of trade in services has 
been rare indeed. NAFTA itself, for example, only makes a reference to a deadline in connection to 
quantitative restrictions where it commits to "endeavor to negotiate" their elimination "periodically, 
but in any event at least every two years".18 For all other types of general (and not sectoral) 
obligations, NAFTA is silent regarding deadlines —whether in the overall preamble to the 
agreement or in its articles on general aims and objectives. This has been reproduced in the US 
bilaterals in Latin America where not even a comparable provision on quantitative restrictions 
appears. Thus, for all the annexes that in NAFTA and the US bilaterals refer to national treatment, 
most-favored-nation, local presence, performance requirements or senior management and boards 
of directors, in addition to future measures, activities reserved to the State and quantitative 
restrictions, there is no time limit as to by when full liberalization should be achieved.  
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The only reference to general deadlines in the subsequent US bilaterals refers only to 
consulting annually to review the implementation of the related chapter (cross-border) "and 
consider issues of mutual interest —which is quite different from a commitment to full 
liberalization. The Chile-US pact, as mentioned before, also had a reference to citizenship and 
permanent residency requirements but only with a view to "determining the feasibility of" 
removing restrictions.19 As shown on table 7 above, only sectoral provisions tend to have deadlines 
in some cases —as for professional and financial services in the US bilaterals. The same table has 
also shown how the commitment to reviews is more ambitious in the EU bilaterals with Mexico 
and Chile. In fact, the Mexico-EU pact is clearly the most ambitious, being the only one of the 
agreements under purview herein that has a clear time horizon.  
Even though GATS is clearly more flexible (less "liberalizing") than NAFTA in overall 
terms, the fact is that GATS tends to be more comprehensive in its coverage and in its provisions 
than NAFTA. Some of that distinction has been brought forward to subsequent agreements. Thus, 
the Mexican and Chilean agreements with the EU apply to all four modes of supply and do not 
limit the scope of any of them as do the US bilaterals in regards to mode 4 where only "business 
persons" are subject to any liberalization commitment. In the case of the Chile-EU agreement, the 
definition of national treatment is the same as GATS, contrary to NAFTA and the US bilaterals 
which are silent on crucial matters such as formally identical or formally different treatment, or the 
notion of modification of conditions of competition as a parameter for gauging the treatment 
actually afforded. The Chile-EU agreement has another particularity where it is more ambitious 
than any of the other agreements herein considered: it does not provide for the possibility of 
reserving m.f.n. treatment —a clear pro-liberalization instrument in and of itself.  
For the most part, however, both GATS and NAFTA approaches have become considerably 
hybrid in subsequent agreements, mixing crucial elements from both "schools" to reflect as best as 
possible particularities of each negotiating context. Thus, while the US bilaterals have increasingly 
adopted the GATS rendition of market access or national treatment alongside domestic regulation 
and mutual recognition, the EU bilaterals have borrowed NAFTA's negative listing in the case of 
the Mexico agreement and various provisions in the chapter on financial services in both the 
Mexico and Chile agreements. This "hybridization" of subsequent agreements on trade in services 
in Latin America (and other places) has made them converge in important aspects. This is why, 
increasingly, the proof of the pudding is in whether there are clear deadlines by which 
liberalization is to be achieved and, most importantly, whether these deadlines are being at all 
respected. 
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VII. Policy Space: Which Policy, 
What Space? 
A common criticism of agreements on trade in services has been 
that they result in very little effective liberalization. As the 
agreements, starting with the GATS, hardly ever have clear deadlines 
for full market openings while they permit countries either not to bind 
at all or to bind limitations or reservations, including for future 
measures, it is only "natural" that liberalization as such would be the 
exception, and not the rule, in most cases. It could be said that the 
main objective served (not sought) by most trade in services 
agreements is to lock-in place existing regulatory situations (and not 
change them), whether they are particularly open or particularly 
closed, vis-à-vis foreign interests. 
A. Sensitive Matter 
Paradoxically, however, agreements that cover trade in services 
have been consistently regarded as particularly sensitive for 
governments around the world —both from developing as well as 
developed countries. The reason for that, contrary to a perception 
commonly held in some quarters, has less to do with the pros and cons 
of liberalization per se than with the much more pressing and complex 
issue of how best to regulate a national economy with a view to 
fulfilling a number of diversified strategic policy objectives. Some 
countries may feel they have already done their best in that regard and 
are therefore confident to commit to existing situations internationally, 
via trade agreements. Others may feel they still have a way to go in 
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order to "put their house in order" and are, accordingly, hesitant to make international 
commitments. Quite a few happen to be somewhere in the middle, perhaps feeling confident about 
some sectors and not about others.  
In Latin America as in the rest of the world, therefore, agreements covering trade in services 
introduce the notion of binding existing regulatory situations —which, in principle, may seem 
much less ambitious than agreements that foresee actual tariff cuts or the elimination of subsidies 
(as is the case in industrial products and agriculture). It is true that tariff or subsidy reductions tend 
to be more visible and, certainly, more quantifiable than some of the barriers to trade in services. 
Nevertheless, binding services-related regulations, as opposed to numerical reduction levels of 
protection in goods trade, is widely regarded as a sensitive matter for two main overriding reasons:  
• The impact of regulatory changes, particularly in services sectors whose relationship to an 
economy tends to be much more multi-faceted and multi-targeted than in goods sectors, 
are difficult to ascertain ex ante: one needs to try and err first, take a hard look at the 
impact ex post, and then go back to the regulatory table to reformulate and even re-
regulate accordingly;  
• Since binding effectively "freezes" a maximum level of restriction for particular sectors 
or modes of supply, countries that bind need to be convinced that the existing regulatory 
situation is acceptable (or optimal) not only at the time the binding is undertaken but also, 
and most importantly, for the near and distant future, given that once bound it cannot be 
changed "backwards" (more restrictive) unless a high price is paid for it (compensating 
partners in an agreement). 
The preservation of "policy space" thus emerges as an important concern relating to services 
for many countries insofar as trade in services agreements tend to limit the discretion of 
governments to regulate or re-regulate as or when they please.  
The new millennium after all brought with it a strong criticism of the principal tenets of the 
so-called "Washington Consensus", some of which impinge strongly on services activities such as 
privatization, deregulation, and market opening in general. Many countries, particularly 
developing, have tried to change and adapt their policy and regulatory structures in order to address 
perceived problems with those policies. That has required "policy space" —i.e., room to change 
regulations, including if necessary towards making them more restrictive to foreign interests. 
Whether much has really happened in that direction ever since, or whether instead necessary 
reforms have been further delayed, is matter for an analysis which is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. What can be safely affirmed, however, is that this type of questioning is at the 
bottom of the policy space debate, as countries attempt to "correct" past, and avoid future, 
mistakes. Locking-in place whatever they have in their regulatory regime can be seen as an 
unwarranted straight-jacket at a time when much should be re-examined, restructured and 
ultimately re-regulated on the basis of recent experience. 
It should be noted that the notion of addressing "development" in the current round of 
negotiations at the WTO tracks broadly with the overall preservation of policy space. Those that 
favor addressing development issues more directly seek either the recognition of specific policies 
or measures that should be permitted for development reasons, or, alternatively, the introduction of 
principles that provide for a "blanket" permission for development-related policy or measures. In 
both cases, the overriding objective is to preserve the space to make policy —development 
policy— and to avoid any possible further encroachment into the domestic regulatory realm. 
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B. Specific Provisions 
The differences that have been herein explored among agreements on trade in services have a 
corresponding differentiated impact on the question of policy space. Clearly, the scope, depth and 
obligation implied by negotiated provisions and commitments in each case define the space 
governments will retain to make policy and regulate. It is the combination of a number of factors, 
however - and not merely specific factors in isolation - which is crucial in this context.  
In terms of definition and coverage, for example, agreements vary as to whether they cover 
measures by local governments or not. Clearly, EU bilaterals tend to limit policy space more than 
US or Japan bilaterals since they include all levels of government in their scope. Regarding the 
regulatory situation of countries, the scope of provisions can also determine the leeway countries 
retain to regulate matters such as tribunals, review, appeal and others. US bilaterals here tend to be 
more ambitious and therefore limit the space of policy-makers since they have more complete and 
detailed provisions than the GATS itself and stipulate their application to the whole universe of 
covered sectors and not only to those included in country schedules of specific commitments —as 
does the GATS. EU bilaterals do not even provide for this type of language in their agreements 
with Latin American countries.  
Most of the curtailing of policy space takes place as a result of the mechanics of 
liberalization of the agreements in question —once again, always in conjunction with other related 
elements and, in particular, with the concepts incorporated into core principles of liberalization. 
The main parameters in this context are the following: 
• Whether the agreement requires the full elimination of restrictions and the full binding of 
the resulting regulatory situation within a certain time period; 
• Whether the agreement requires the full binding of a country's regulatory situation but not 
necessarily the full elimination of restrictions within a certain time period; 
• Whether the agreement requires the full binding of a country's regulatory situation within 
a certain time period but allows for the binding of future restrictive measures; 
• Whether the agreement allows for the non-binding of sectors or modes of supply; 
Agreements such as the US bilaterals that go by a negative list approach to scheduling are 
clearly more limiting than EU bilaterals that adopt a positive list approach. Since the negative list 
approach requires that all sectors be included and bound and that any restrictive measure be 
inscribed otherwise the sector is considered fully liberalized, governments do surrender more of 
their regulatory power under US bilaterals than, for example, the EU bilateral with Chile or the 
GATS itself.  
All the same, US bilaterals provide for the scheduling of future measures whereby countries 
preserve the "space" to adopt or maintain specific measures that can relate to full sectors (the case 
of maritime transport services in NAFTA, for example). In spite of the transparency provided by 
the scheduling of such entries, the fact is that annexes on future measures in NAFTA and US 
bilaterals are equivalent to a blanket non-binding of measures, the resulting effect being in no way 
distinct from the exclusion of sectors, modes or measures under positive listing as set out by the 
GATS and its follower agreements. 
The scope of what is inscribed in schedules depends, of course, on the core principles to 
which scheduling obligations relate. Under the GATS and GATS-based agreements, schedules 
relate primarily to the principles of market access and national treatment, including a third column 
that addresses "additional commitments" which are only "additional" to the extent that they go 
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beyond those two principles. NAFTA and US bilaterals do not limit themselves to reservations with 
respect to market access and national treatment. While on the one hand, they would seem to be 
more ambitious than GATS since they prescribe more detailed obligations on key aspects of trade 
in services such as the prohibition of local presence, senior management and boards of directors, or 
the provision of new financial services, the fact remains that for all these principles reservations 
can be made in specific annexes. Annexes in NAFTA and US bilaterals are structured, of course, 
on the basis of a negative listing of sectors and measures so that the whole universe of sectors and 
measures is covered and the transparency effect is maximal. The depth of any liberalization 
achieved will not hinge, however, on the strong language of the principles but instead on the 
reservations taken in their regard. 
The fact is that neither the GATS, nor NAFTA, nor the bilaterals ensued since in Latin 
America and around the world, have provided for liberalization principles of automatic application 
—i.e., principles that are not negotiable or against which reservations or limitations cannot be 
lodged. Where that might have been expected —on the matter of subsidies— GATS has missed a 
number of self-imposed deadlines for concluding related disciplines while regionally countries 
have not even tried to negotiate them. Government procurement has fared a little better, having 
been included in a number of NAFTA-like agreements, including the US bilaterals in Latin 
America. Still, chapters on government procurement also foresee the recourse to negotiation and 
annexes of entities and specific goods and services so that its application is not in any way 
universal form the outset. There is no doubt that the presence or absence of government 
procurement disciplines in an agreement is a crucial measure of the extent to which policy makers 
would or not lose their space in a matter of great strategic importance. On subsidies, matters are a 
little different since even in the absence of specific disciplines in the GATS, for example, member 
countries still have to schedule existing subsidies whenever they violate the precepts of the market 
access or national treatment articles —i.e., their policy space regarding the concession of subsidies 
has in any case been curtailed. 
The ultimate curtailment of policy space a trade agreement, whether in goods or services, can 
provide goes beyond the type of scheduling of restrictive measures or the liberalization principles 
against which these measures must gauged as to their restrictive effect. Agreements that definitely 
put a stop on certain prerogatives of national regulators are the ones that have deadlines for doing 
things —particularly those that lead to the full elimination of barriers to trade. Thus, for example, 
agreements such as the Chile-EU which foresee a review within three years from the entry into 
force of the agreement with a view to "further deepening liberalization" constitute a bigger "threat" 
to national policy-makers than agreements such as the US bilaterals in Latin America which merely 
call for annual consultations with a view to "review[ing] the implementation and consider other 
matters of mutual interest".  
The more forceful and direct language of the Chile-EU agreement points to a definite time 
frame within which more liberalization will have to occur and regulators on both sides will have to 
surrender their purview over related matters to the obligations of the bilateral agreement. In the 
absence of any overall or sector-specific time horizon for full liberalization, ambitious scheduling 
methods or strongly enunciated obligations do not amount to much since countries can negotiate 
and lodge reservations which may simply remain indefinitely and safely "frozen" in time. The real 
limitation will depend on whether countries can negotiate the extent to which they apply these 
principles and, most importantly, whether the agreement as a whole or in part foresees deadlines 
for full liberalization.  
It is the combination of mechanics of liberalization, scope of liberalization under core 
principles, and, most importantly, the existence of a commitment to liberalization within a certain 
time horizon, which can effectively seal the fate of policy-makers in countries that are parties to 
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trade in services agreements. Individual features of agreements are important but never in isolation. 
Finally, an aspect which is absent the text of any agreement but has a major influence on policy 
space is bargaining power: there is no doubt that countries with more bargaining power can 
effectively limit the policy space of countries with less bargaining power by "forcing" more 
ambitious disciplines or commitments when negotiating agreements —particularly bilateral ones. 
C. Core Spots 
The conceptual conflict underlying the debate on policy space is that between foreign trade 
liberalization and national sovereignty or autonomy. It is to be expected that a trade agreement 
would seek to eliminate barriers to trade. The difficulty does not reside there but on the trade vs. 
non-trade divide which is brought forward with particular vigor in agreements relating to services 
liberalization. The fact that the regulation of services goes beyond trade to reflect much broader 
national policy objectives introduces an unprecedented set of issues for which neither the GATS 
nor the agreements that followed it around the world have found consistent solutions. Article VI of 
the GATS and many later renditions of it at the regional level have addressed these issues only to a 
partial extent. The core problem of where to draw the line on trade and non-trade related matters in 
services remains for the most part unresolved.  
For many developing countries "trade" does not lead necessarily to "development". For 
many, therefore, development is viewed as largely a non-trade-related matter, one that is highly 
influenced by national policy objectives which, in addition to ensuring the quality of services and 
services suppliers, address the "developmental asymmetries" between developed and developing 
countries. This dichotomy between the development and the non-development related universes 
mirrors in turn the dichotomy between economic efficiency vs. the distributional, social and 
cultural objectives embodied in the domestic regulation applying to services activities. Once again, 
there is nothing wrong with a trade agreement seeking economic efficiency via an increase in trade 
flows, contestability and competition. The problem for policy-makers —particularly in democracies 
where policies and regulations have a much stronger accountability vis-à-vis ballot boxes— is the 
extent to which the economic efficiency sought out by these agreements may or may not override 
legitimate developmental objectives by imposing an unwarranted level of obligations on member 
countries. Agreements on trade in services, whether in Latin America or elsewhere, have been often 
criticized for doing just that. 
D. Investment, Privatization 
The GATS has already been widely criticized by some quarters for having included a supply 
mode that requires investment on the part of suppliers —i.e., commercial presence or the 
possibility of establishment by foreign suppliers in national markets. Many perceive the GATS to 
be imposing the elimination of investment restrictions via the  application of market access and 
national treatment provisions to mode 3. The WTO itself has responded in its webpage to these 
criticisms by pointing to the negotiated nature of the market access and national treatment 
obligations and the fact that member countries can keep restrictions as long as they schedule them. 
As demonstrated above, Latin American bilaterals with developed countries, particularly 
those with the U.S., have gone further than the GATS by including a full chapter on investment 
which applies to both goods and services. They have, correspondingly, been even more criticized 
than the GATS, particularly since they go beyond just promotion and protection to include 
effective liberalization provisions such as market access, national treatment, most-favored-nation, 
standard of treatment, minimum standard of treatment, senior management and board of directors 
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and performance requirements. In other words, the criticism is first and foremost about the fact that 
these investment provisions had gone way beyond traditional and even more recent bilateral 
investment treaties since they delve into access obligations. 
Of all the different principles whose application, albeit subject to reservations, may encroach 
on a national regulator’s scope of activity, the one that has caused most of the preoccupation in 
Latin American bilaterals has been the provision on performance requirements. Under NAFTA and 
US bilaterals, such requirements are the object of a specific article that textually purports to 
prohibit them for both goods and services. The article details seven types of specific measures that 
should be eliminated and prescribe their prohibition with a particularly forceful language.20 These 
measures are precisely the requirements that many developing countries would like to have the 
right to apply. Since a great deal of the mistakes of the recent past have been often perceived by 
these countries as derived from liberal policies such as privatization or the freeing of ownership 
and control requirements, the possible curtailment of space to apply these performance policies is 
seen as a major obstacle to what many of these countries consider the restoration of an adequate 
equilibrium in their FDI regime.  
As mentioned in the previous section, the fact remains that strong disciplines do not amount 
to as much as they sound in the absence of some equally strong mechanics of liberalization, 
including first and foremost, deadlines for phasing-outs or the full elimination of restrictions. In 
regard to performance requirements, as with respect to all other strong core liberalization principles 
included in US bilaterals, parties can enter reservations with respect to the principle so that what is 
stringent in the letter of the agreement is actually tempered by the possibility of negotiation and 
reservation. In addition, NAFTA and US bilaterals are unambitious in terms of deadlines so that 
there is no time frame within which performance requirements that have been lodged as 
reservations need to be eliminated. In none of those agreements, negotiators have gone back to the 
negotiating the elimination or phasing out of those requirements.  
To say, therefore, that NAFTA and US bilaterals are necessarily more ambitious than GATS 
and some EU bilaterals with respect to performance requirements or other equally-ambitious 
themes is therefore overly simplistic. This is particularly true given that if countries do apply any of 
the performance requirements normally listed in the US bilaterals, they would still have to schedule 
them under GATS for committed sectors. In other words, if a country required that 60% of its 
prime TV time were reserved to national productions, it would certainly have to schedule that 
"performance requirement" for a national content if it chose to include audiovisual services in its 
schedule of specific commitments. To say that GATS, NAFTA or US bilaterals constitute a definite 
curtailment of policy space is, however, overly simplistic as well since countries have some 
effective room for negotiation and the agreements are lack on time-frames and deadlines. 
E. Public Services, Public Interest 
One major critique of regional agreements dealing with services trade, whether in Latin 
America or elsewhere, emanates from some misguided perceptions —namely: that these 
agreements will tend to finish with public services; that these agreements call for privatization; that 
these agreements prohibit the public funding of national institutions; that public services will no 
longer be regulated according to the public interest. These concerns have certainly been brought 
out in the context of education and health services, both of which have a strong social component. 
Public services such as water distribution services, often supplied by public institutions, including 
via a monopoly, have also been the object of some concern. Developing countries tend to be more 
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sensitive to these matters given their perceived need to maintain the control of these areas in order 
to ensure the fulfillment of important national policy objectives such as universalization of access 
to essential services.  
None of the agreements herein analyzed have obligations on privatization. None of them 
oblige parties to finish with monopolies, whether public or private. None of them have disciplines 
on subsidies although discriminatory subsidies should be reserved or scheduled in some 
agreements. None of the agreements oblige parties to give up the right to regulate, particularly in 
regard to measures that related to quality, safety, price or other policy objectives that aim to ensure 
a certain quality level of the service. What most of the agreements do say of particular relevance to 
public services is that services provided in the exercise of governmental authority are fully outside 
their scope of application or liberalization. Thus, public services provided by governments are not 
covered by these agreements to begin with and should not be as threatened as has been assumed in 
some quarters.  
F. Regulatory Autonomy 
GATS, NAFTA and the agreements that followed have in large measure been sensitive to the 
fact that services liberalization is not supposed to eradicate completely a nation’s right to regulate 
its services activities. Unlike goods, services are regulated according to diverse national policy 
objectives, perhaps most of which have nothing to do with economic efficiency or trade as such. 
Since by virtue of the four modes of supply all agreements covering services nowadays are 
applicable to a host of domestic measures, a place to draw the line between acceptable and non-
acceptable, or compliant or non-compliant, regulations was imperative. GATS Article VI did just 
that by focusing on measures relating to qualification requirements, technical standards and 
licensing requirements and permitting related measures that were based on objective and 
transparent criteria, were not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service 
and, in the case of licensing procedures, were not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the 
service. Latin American bilaterals with developed countries followed that orientation. 
Although provisions on domestic regulation aim to discipline the application of some crucial 
types of measures in the supply of services (qualification requirements, technical standards and 
licensing requirements), they do not aim to discipline the whole universe of possible measures 
regulating services —and certainly not the non-market part of that universe. Countries primarily 
retain the right to regulate as long as they do not abuse their prerogative by being too 
discriminatory, opaque or bureaucratic in the administration of their regulatory regimes. Thus, the 
critique that agreements covering services ultimately aim to end, or severely limit, the right to 
regulate has to be taken with a grain of salt.  
It remains incumbent upon each country, however, to know best how to regulate its service 
economy. In that sense, it is a matter of great urgency that countries define the aims, objectives and 
means to achieve optimal regulation before committing to trade agreements. Countries that neglect 
to do so will always have themselves to blame —and not the trade agreements. 
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VIII. Policy Lessons and the  
Multilateral vs. Bilateral/ 
Subregional Dichotomy 
The experience had by Latin American countries that opted for 
negotiating trade in services agreements with developed countries is 
very rich and enlightening. To a large extent, it demonstrates the limits 
of a number of related elements common to services negotiations. As 
the countries from the region that have concluded these pacts vary 
widely in many of their attributes ranging from social and economic 
development to regulatory capacities and export competitiveness in 
services, any commonalities across agreements can be understood to 
reveal more about the developed than necessarily about the particular 
needs or aspirations of the developing trading partner. For example, 
the fact that US bilaterals, in all cases, have backtracked from NAFTA 
provisions on the elimination of citizenship and permanent residency 
requirements clearly points to changing determinants in the US and 
not in its trading partners.  
As a general rule, it does not seem that differing bargaining 
capabilities on the part of Latin American countries have been able to 
produce notable differences in outcomes. There may, however, have 
been a coincidence between the lack of bargaining power on the part 
of some countries and the willingness to concede anyway on the part 
of others. At the root of this question is the appreciation, particular to 
each country, of what is the value of conceding in trade negotiations 
which in turn hinges on the view a country has of liberalization as a 
vehicle of growth and development. Another (blunt) way of putting it 
would be to say that in many cases what Chile or Mexico may have  
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been willing to concede, for example, the Cafta countries may have had to concede even when 
unwillingly in order for the agreement to reach a conclusion. 
From a policy point of view, there may have been a number of lessons to draw. The ten most 
important ones, on the basis of the findings of the present paper, are the following: 
1.-  Not all Latin American countries have reasons to engage in trade in services 
agreements with developed trading partners. There seems to be three types of Latin American 
countries taking the lead in the current services regime:  
a.- Countries that have already gone through major internal reforms, have opened up their 
economies either autonomously or by means of trade agreements and are ready to 
demand reciprocity for having done so –—such as Chile and Mexico; and,  
b.- Countries that have not necessarily gone through major internal reforms, have not 
necessarily opened up their service sectors either autonomously or by means of a trade 
agreement but that are ready to engage for systemic reasons (proximity to US 
interests) or the preservation of specific interests (Andean countries with the link 
between trade preferences and drug eradication);  
   c.-Countries that fall under a and b above —such as Peru. 
2.-  Developed countries are pursuing the easiest route to liberalization, one that will cost 
them the least. By striking deals with countries that are willing for a number of different 
reasons, the US and the EU can wage their bargaining power, get what they want and avoid 
conceding on what they do not want. Thus, for example, the US has made its bilaterals worse 
than NAFTA insofar as mode 4 is concerned while for the EU excluding audiovisual services 
and including commitments on maritime services is easier even than at the WTO; 
 
3.-  There is no dilemma between the multilateral and the regional "theater" in services trade. 
Countries seem to be perfectly comfortable with a "co-habitation" of both systems in services. If 
the option were really one or the other, perhaps one should be able to discern something 
different than the proliferation of status quo binding agreements and with little commitment at 
that. The evidence shows that the rule is for countries to do a "one-shot" deal, often in the 
absence of a final date for full liberalization, and walk away from the negotiating table almost 
indefinitely. Various NAFTA commitments were not delivered (eliminating citizenship and 
residency requirements, for example), Mexico and the EU did not yet comply with their 
February 2001 commitment to have schedules with ten-year phasing-outs within three year  
—i.e., February 2004. There is no real liberalization occurring regionally— and much less so 
multilaterally; 
 
4.-  The regional regime in services did not "pick up where the multilateral regime left" as 
was in some measure expected. In some cases, regionalism went backwards. The Uruguay 
Round had a fairly substantive "built-in" agenda in services: some sectoral negotiations and 
commitments for negotiations (and, in some cases, conclusions) on certain framework 
principles, namely, emergency safeguard measures, subsidies and government procurement. In 
addition, GATS Article VI called for additional work on a number of regulatory issues. On the 
sectors, in most cases herein considered, WTO post-Uruguay Round results were bound 
regionally. On the principles, however, not much at all has happened. Not even in mutual 
recognition agreements, a matter which "naturally" should lend itself to bilateral or plurilateral 
agreements, has there been any discernible push. As to going backwards, mode 4 in NAFTA and 
subsequent US bilaterals come to mind; 
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5.-  Despite the much acclaimed "tale of two models"21 between GATS and NAFTA, it would be 
a far shot to uphold that different models resulted in significantly different outcomes across 
agreements. The Latin American agreements with developed trading partners attest to that fact. The 
main determining differences are not in the mechanism for liberalization or the language of core 
principles. They are in the overall commitment to liberalization that countries bring to the 
negotiating table which is reflected in provisions dealing with reviews with a view to deepening 
liberalization or commitments with a clear time frame. In the Chile-EU agreement, for example, it 
is much more important that there is a review every three years to "reduce or eliminate remaining 
restrictions" than the positive list approach adopted in the agreement; 
 
6.-  Regional agreements with Latin American countries have had little of the so-called 
"development issues" reflected in them. Countries in the region have either not demanded 
sufficiently or not been able to get the inclusion of "development-friendly" provisions in the 
agreements they negotiated with developed trading partners. Chile, in its agreement with the EU, 
did include a number of cooperation provisions including a specific one for services (Article 20) 
but still nothing of the dimension that normally is negotiated by the EU with countries in Africa, 
including South Africa, and in Asia. Defining what "development-friendly" is in the context of the 
FTAs on services has, however, been as difficult as it has been for the multilateral system. The 
Doha "Development" Agenda has been at pains to define forms of addressing the issue; 
 
7.-  Domestic regulation should perhaps be the main focus of agreements on services, 
particularly the ones involving developing and developed countries. All aspects of domestic 
regulation —transparency, good governance and regulatory requirements— are crucial for the 
functioning of a "balanced" market economy since they provide the predictability and reliability 
necessary for economic operators to produce, supply, invest and grow. Most of the issues reflected 
in GATS Article VI and most of the agreements considered herein are important, first and 
foremost, to national entrepreneurs who also need to have a predictable and reliable administrative, 
regulatory and policy framework within which to do business. Focusing on domestic regulation 
both as a demandeur as well as a "rule-taker" should be put forward much more forcefully than has 
often been the case; 
 
8.-  Mutual recognition agreements can perhaps be a much more forward way to address 
regulatory issues and provide for predictability and reliability for both sides of a particular trade in 
services agreement —thus, also contributing to greater trade and investment flows. Many of the 
measures that countries tend to bind (or not even bind) in their schedules of specific commitments, 
whether multilaterally or regionally, are measures that could be somehow dealt with or bypassed by 
mutual recognition agreements. This aspect of regional agreements has been too skimpily resorted 
to but could provide a means to go right at the core of potential regulatory problems for both 
developed and developing countries. Developed countries tend to have the more intricate and 
sophisticated regulatory regimes and developing countries should benefit from learning about them 
while trying to see how to reconcile existing practices overseas with the realities at home; 
 
9.-  The curtailment of the so-called "policy space" of developing countries has not been as 
dramatic as some suggest. If there is one thing that services agreements indeed do, it is to lock-in 
domestic measures that can embody important national policy objectives, reason for which they can 
be seen with suspicion by countries that are still not satisfied or comfortable with their own internal 
agenda and therefore want to avoid freezing it in international schedules of commitments. What has 
become evident in all the various agreements herein considered is that even in the presence of 
                                                     
21
 The expression has been used by the author in another article whose publication is forthcoming: "Regional Trade in Services 
Agreements: Dilemma or Inertia?" 
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strong language regarding sensitive matters such as performance requirements, the praxis is to 
allow for the scheduling of reservations or limitations. On matters such as prior comment on 
proposed changes in relevant laws and regulations, bilaterals have gone back and forth but 
presumably there is room to negotiate its exclusion from a pact.  
 
10.- Free trade agreements on services, as their counterparts on goods, tend to bypass the most 
important issues that persist in developing country economies. The liberalization of trade in 
services may be an important ingredient in a country’s policy mix for growth and development but 
it clearly is only an ingredient amongst a host of other ingredients. It is neither an ambitious, nor an 
unambitious, agreement that will put a particular country in the right economic and social path no 
matter how complete and innovative, or neutral and innocuous, is the agreement in question. The 
right path can only be drawn by the country itself via a clear appreciation of what is necessary and 
the political will alongside the means to effectively do it. These agreements should not be seen as a 
panacea but as a means to an end. The matter would require further research and reflection, 
certainly, but if the regional regime is to be a "mover and a shaker" in economic relations in 
services (and in all other economic sectors), it should increasingly address "real world" issues such 
as the infrastructural deficiencies of developing countries, their inadequate access to international 
financial and technological markets, the high cost of doing business (partly a domestic regulation 
issue as mentioned before) and, of course, their export interest in services. It would be naïve to 
suppose that, for example, the opening up of the financial market via a trade agreement or a liberal 
offer on infrastructural services could necessarily result in solutions to the everyday problems of 
the developing world. A single liberalization focus may simply not do the trick. 
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